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Fair Use and Educational Copying:
A Reexamination of Princeton
University Press v. Michigan
Document Services, Inc.
BY GILBERT BUSBY*
I. INTRODUCTION
magine you are a professor in charge of teaching an esoteric course
that is being offered for the first time at your institution. Scouring
the literature, you discover no textbook that completely encapsu-
lates all the ideas you wish to present. Therefore, you decide to supplement
your chosen textbook with selected readings from a wide variety of
sources. Not wishing to inflict the cost of purchasing all of these works on
your students, you decide to have the local copy shop prepare an anthology
of the excerpts in booklet form. This allows the students access to all of
these ideas at once for a minimal fee. You're happy because you can now
teach the class the way you feel is best, and your students are happy
because they have saved some time and money.
Unfortunately, the publishers of the copyrighted works you have
excerpted are not very happy. The copy shop has not paid for the privilege
of copying these works, so the publishers feel cheated out of their licensing
revenue.' They send letters to the copy shop threatening litigation unless it
pays a substantial fee for a license. The copy shop, frightened by the
possibility of litigation and unwilling to pay for a license, agrees to halt
J.D. expected 1999, University of Kentucky.
Without the income from licensing fees, the value of the publisher's copyright
is diminished.
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preparation of the "course packs."2 This leaves you with a difficult decision.
Unable to prepare the anthologies, you are left with only two choices: cease
teaching those concepts not covered by the textbook, or inflict the burden of
finding and copying all the outside readings onto your students.
Neither approach is very appealing. Unfortunately, these are the only
choices available. Publishers have attempted to "impose a nation-wide halt
on the production of educational course packets without permission of
copyright holders,"3 despite the fact that the Copyright Act of 1976 contains
a specific fair use exemption for the copying of educational materials
Several commentators5 have assertedthat these attempts to obtain compensa-
tion through licensing fees for educational copying frustrate the underlying
purpose of copyright. Indeed, the constitutional purpose of copyright is "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"' rather than to "reward the
labor of authors."7 The guiding rationale of copyright law is that by granting
authors a limited monopoly over the use of their works, we give them an
economic incentive to produce more works, thereby accelerating the growth
and dissemination of knowledge.8 This purpose is frustratedwhen publishers
force copy shops (and by extension, professors and students) to pay fees for
the fair use of copyrighted works. By forcing copy shops to pay unnecessary
fees, the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge in our colleges and
universities is needlessly stifled, not enhanced.9
2 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
3 Albert D. Spalding, Fair Use ofResearch and Course Packets in the Class-
room, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 447,448 (1993).
4 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also infra Part Im.
' See Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four Causes
of Action, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259, 261 (1994); see also L. Ray Patterson,
Copyright and "the Exclusive Right" ofAuthors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 42 (1993)
(stating that copyright owners are "asserting their limited rights 'in absolute terms
to the exclusion of all else' as a part of their campaign to create what is tantamount
to a black market consisting of unlawfully claimed copyright rights" (quoting Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 n.13 (1984))).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(holding that although an author may create an original compilation of facts
that is copyrightable, the facts themselves are not original and may not be copy-
righted).
8 See Heald, supra note 5, at 261.
9 See id. (arguing that "[w]hen consumers are induced to pay for materials un-
necessarily, the cost of using [expressive materials] rises and the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution and of Congress is frustrated").
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Publishers have recently resorted to decidedly unsavory tactics in their
attempts to control educational copying. For example, they have sent letters
threatening to sue copy shops for infringement unless they agree to pay
royalties or licensing fees.'0 They have, in effect, bullied copy shops into
believing that they have an unimpeachable claim of copyright, even in
situations that did not warrant such a belief." Their position has unfortu-
nately been enhanced by recent case law.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc. 2 that a
copy shop infringed the copyrights of several publishers by reproducing
and selling "course packs" containing numerous excerpts from the
publishers' copyrighted works. 3 Students used the course packs for
educational purposes in their college classes. The copy shop had refused to
pay the licensing fees requested by the publisher. 4 The district court held
that there had been willful infringement of the publishers' copyrights, 5 but
a Sixth Circuit panel vacated that decision. 6 The Sixth Circuit subse-
'o See Letter from Virginia Antos, Director of Copyright Compliance, Associa-
tion of American Publishers, to Bel-Jean Copy/Print Center (Mar. 1, 1993),
reproduced in Patterson, supra note 5, at 44. The following is an example of the
language used in the letter.
We call on you to agree ... to cease and desist from copying, without
permission, multipage excerpts of copyrighted works for sale to students.
In addition, the scope of the infringement identified above, committed in
the face of the widely publicized decision in Basic Books v. Kinko's,
warrants a payment of $ 2,500 to help defray the costs of the AAP's
copyright enforcement program in this matter and to impress on your
business the need to operate in compliance with controlling law.
Id. at47.
" See Heald, supra note 5, at 259-60. A similar problem occurs when publish-
ers attempt to claim copyrights in works already in the public domain, such as
when copyrights are claimed in a Bach cantata or a Shakespeare play. See id.
12 Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
'" See id. at 1390-92.
"4 See id. at 1384.
," See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Sevs., Inc., 855 F. Supp.
905, 912 (E.D. Mich. 1994), afi'd inpart and vacated inpart, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
16 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 74 F. 3d 1528,
vacated by 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997); see
infra Part HI for a discussion of the fair use doctrine.
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quently granted a rehearing en banc and reversed the panel in an 8-5
decision, holding that the copy shop's use of the copyrighted materials "did
not constitute fair use."'1
7
This Note will consider the application of the fair use defense in
Michigan Document Services. This issue was one of first impression, 8 and
nothing has changed to undercut its importance since. Part H1 of this Note
will briefly recapitulate the origin and purpose of copyright law. Part 11
will analyze, in general terms, the fair use doctrine - its history, conceptual
underpinnings, and previous applications in the educational copying
context. Part IV2 will present an analysis of the fair use discussion in
Michigan Document Services. Part VI will analyze the impact of this
decision. Finally, Part VI will summarize why the case was wrongfully
decided.
II. BACKGROUND ON COPYRIGHT LAW
The power to grant and regulate copyright is delegated to Congress in
the United States Constitution. Article I, section 8, clause 8 provides:
The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the Exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies. 23
The Copyright Clause thus states its overriding goal: "To promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts."24 Any analysis of a copyright
problem must take into account the constitutional purposes behind
copyright law.25 The Copyright Clause is a limitation on, as well as a grant
17 Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1383.
18 See id. at 1394.
'9 See infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 38-91 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 92-246 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 247-250 and accompanying text.
23 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
24 Id.
2' See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation ofAmerican Copyright
Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119,
1129 (1983).
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of, legislative power.26 This limitation is very important, as it enables
Congress to impose the conditions that are necessary for copyright to
accommodate the interests of three groups - authors, publishers, and
members of the public - in order to promote learning. 7 The Committee
Report accompanying the 1909 Copyright Act stated the purpose of
copyright best:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms
of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has
in his writings.... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will
be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by
securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their
writings.21
The 1961 Report on the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law also stated the underlying constitu-
tional values protected by copyright: "As reflected in the Constitution, the
ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is to foster the growth of learning
and culture for the public welfare, and the grant of exclusive rights to
authors for a limited time is a means to that end."'29 The courts have
recognizedthe importance of analyzing copyright issues with these guiding
principles in mind3 As the United States Supreme Court stated in Mazer
v. Stein:3'
26 See Patterson, supra note 5, at 4.
27 See Abrams, supra note 25, at 1127.
21 H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (quoted in SHELDON W. HALPERN ETAL.,
COPYRIGHT CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (West 1992)).
29 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS ON GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 5 (Comm.
Print 1961) (quoted in HALPERN ET AL., supra note 28).
30 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974)
("The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims on the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and other arts." (citations omitted)); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law... makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration.").
31 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and
useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.32
Although copyright does provide the author with protection, this
protection is not without limits. There is a strict time limitation,33 and not
all material is copyrightable.34 In addition, there are a set of requirements
that a work must satisfy in order to be protectable Further, the rights
granted36 are not absolute in the way some property rights may be absolute.
To the extent that copyright is a property right, it is properly vested with a
public interest, since the "'limited grant is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved."' 37 One of the most important limitations
on the copyright holder's statutory monopoly is the fair use doctrine at
issue in Michigan Document Services.
32 Id. at 219 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
3 The present Copyright Act fixes the end of the term at the life of the author
plus fifty years for most works. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
" Generally, copyright protection extends only to works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium and meet the minimum threshold requirements of
originality and creativity. See generally id. §§ 101, 102 (1976). As a result, facts
and ideas themselves are not protectable. The current laws only protect certain
expressions of those facts and ideas. See First Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
31 See infra notes 51-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of these re-
quirements.
36 The copyright owner has the following five rights: (1) to reproduce the copy-
righted work; (2) to prepare derivative works; (3) to distribute copies of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale, rental, lease, or lending; (4) to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and (5) to display the copyrighted work publicly. See
17 U.S.C. § 106. In practice, authors commonly assign these rights to publishers
in exchange for royalty payments and the publishers' production and marketing of
the author's works: See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S.
539, 547 (1985).
17 Amici Curiae Brief on Behalf of Concerned Professors of Copyright Law at
25, Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381
(6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997) (No. 94-1778).
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Il. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
A. Purpose
The fair use doctrine rests on the assumption that certain forms of
copying are indispensable to the advancement of knowledge and hence
should be exempt from a finding of infringement. 8 As one may imagine,
the question of exactly how far the doctrine extends has been difficult. In
fact, the doctrine of fair use 'is generally regarded as the most troub-
ling issue in the whole law of copyright.3 Courts and commentators have
long been divided over precisely how this issue should be analyzed.4 0 The
House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act sums up the difficulties in this
area:
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine
over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged.
Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally
applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must
be decided on its own facts.4'
The doctrine is best viewed as the inevitable consequence of a process of
balancing the interests of a copyright holder against the public's interest in
the dissemination of information.42 As apractical matter, strict enforcement
of the copyright monopoly would, in some cases, "inhibit the very
'Progress of Science and useful Arts' that copyright is intended to
promote."N3 Ultimately, fair use is based on policy considerations that
honor the purposes of copyright laws.'
38 See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt and Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493,
1499 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), afld, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
31 See Dellarv. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. 2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
40 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105-
07 (1990).
41 H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat.)
5679.
42 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 477 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
' See id. at 477-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. History
The fair use doctrine has a long history. One of the earliest cases to
raise the issue was Gyles v. Wilcox,45 decided in England in 1740. In this
case, the court analyzed the defense of abridgement:
Where books are colourably shortened only, they are undoubtedly
within the meaning of the [copyright act], and are a mere evasion of the
statute, and cannot be called an abridgement. But this must not be carried
so far as to restrain persons from making a real and fair abridgement, for
abridgements may with great propriety be called a new book, because not
only paper and print, but the invention, learning, and judgment of the
author is shewn in them, and in many cases are extremely useful, though
in some instances prejudicial, by mistaking and curtailing the sense of an
author. 4
Fair use first appeared in American law in 1841, Justice Story's
opinion in Folsom v. Marsh.4' Story eloquently summed up the major
factors that have guided American judges ever since:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.48
In 1976, the fair use doctrine was finally codified in § 107 of the
Copyright Act.49 All of the factors Story had originally included in his
analysis were written into this statute. Section 107 serves as a general
limitation on all the rights codified in § 106. Entitled "Limitations on
Exclusive Rights: Fair Use," § 107 provides, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 . . . ,the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
" Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141 (1740).
46 Id. at 143.
41 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
48 Id. at 348.
49 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made ofawork
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.5
C. Application of the Fair Use Factors
1. "Purpose and Character of the Use"
According to the Supreme Court, courts must weigh the four statutory
factors together, keeping in mind that the overriding purpose of copyright
is to facilitate progress in science and the arts.5 In applying the first factor,
"purpose and character of the use," courts generally consider two important
subfactors. First, they consider whether the use is commercial or
nonprofit. 2 The distinction between a commercial and nonprofit use"is not
whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price."53 Although the Supreme Court stated in Sony
Corp. that commercial uses are presumptively unfair,54 the Court later
clarified that the commercial or nonprofit character of the use is only one
factor to be considered when analyzing the "purpose and character of the
use."55 The Courtrecognizedthat ifcommercial uses werepresumedunfair,
"the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in
the preamble paragraph of section 107, including... teaching,... since
these activities 'are generally conducted for profit in this country.' "56 The
50 Id.
51 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
52 See id. at 578.
' Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
54 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,451 (1984).
5. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
56 Id. at 584 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
592).
1997-98]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
second prong of the "purpose and character" inquiry is whether or not the
use is "'transformative."' 57 Here courts examine "whether the new work
merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation ... or instead
adds something new."58 For example, the Supreme Court held in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.," that 2 Live Crew's version of the Roy Orbison
classic "Oh, Pretty Woman" could "reasonably ...be perceived as
commenting on the original or criticizing it" and hence had transformative
value.6" Other courts have applied similar tests to determine whether a use
is truly transformative.61 The Supreme Court, while recognizing that a
transformative use is not required to find fair use, has placed great weight
on this concept. It recognized in Campbell that the "goal of copyright [is]
... generally furthered by the creation of transformative works."'62 The
Court has even gone so far as to state that other factors, such as commercial
use, carry less weight when the alleged by infringing work is highly
transformative.63 Finally, the Court has also recognized an exception to the
transformative use analysis for the "reproduction of multiple copies for
classroom distribution." 64
2. "The Nature of the Copyrighted Work"
Courts usually afford creative works more protection than works of fact
because creative works are at "the core of intended copyright protection."
Factual works, while protectable, are protectable only to the extent that the
work contains original expression -the underlying facts themselves are not
protected.66 In addition, the Court has observed that there is, in general, a
5' Id. at 579 (quoting Leval, supra note 40, at 1111).
5 Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(citations omitted). For a use to be "transformative" it "must be productive and
must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose than
the original." Leval, supra note 40, at 1111. Common transformative uses include
parody, symbolism, and criticism. See id.
" Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
60 Id. at 583.
61 See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913,923-24 (2d
Cir. 1994) (noting the "significant independent value that can stem from conversion
of original journal articles into a format different from their normal appearance").
62 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
63 See id.
6 Id. at 579 n.11.
65 Id. at 586.
66 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,349 (1991).
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greater need to disseminate factual works for public benefit.67 While the
dividing line between creative and factual works is inexact, courts have had
little difficulty applying this factor correctly.
6
3. "The Amount and Substantiality of the
Portion Used in Relation to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole"
This third factor is more than a mechanical evaluation of the quan-
tity of material taken from the original. It considers the quality and
importance of the material used.69 The putative test is whether the excerpts
supersede the original work or constitute the heart of the work.7' Even if the
quantity of the material used is relatively small, this does not necessarily
mean that this factor will weigh in favor of fair use.7 1 In fact, courts have
refused to grant fair use even when the amount of material used was
miniscule, if the material was judged to constitute the heart of the work. 2
There are no real guidelines on exactly how much of a copyrighted work
a person may copy and still be protected by the fair use doctrine, and
decisions regarding this issue have been inconsistent. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that a reproduction of an entire copyrighted work
was protected by the fair use doctrine.73 Generally, however, the larger the
portion of the copyrighted work used, the more likely the court will refuse
to find fair use.74
67 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539,563 (1985).
68 See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1533
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). The court noted:
Factual works, such as biographies, reviews, criticism and commentary, are
believe [by courts] to have a greater public value and, therefore, uses of
them may be better tolerated by the copyright law .... Fictional works, on
the other hand, are often based closely on the author's subjective impres-
sions and, therefore, require more protection.
Using these "general rules of thumb," the court appropriately found that the works
copied in this case were of a factual rather than creative nature. Id.
6 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
70 See Harper & Row, 539 U.S. at 564-65.
71 See id. at 565.
' SeeKinko 's, 758 F. Supp. at 1533-34. The court concluded that "the portions
copied were critical parts of the books copied, since that is the likely reason the
college professors used them in their classes." Id. at 1533.
n See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,449-50 (1984).
4 See Leval, supra note 40, at 1122.
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4. "The Effect of the Use upon the
Potential Market for or Value of the Copyrighted Work"
In applying this fourth factor, the courts evaluate the extent to which
the copy will compete with the original in the marketplace. The courts
must consider the extent of market harm caused by the particular use.76 The
harm to the market for derivative works must also be considered." Finally,
the courts should consider whether or not similar conduct on a broad scale
would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work."
Although the Supreme Court has never spoken on the matter, the Michigan
Document Services courts included the loss of licensing revenues in their
analysis of the fourth factor.7 9 Some courts" consider this factor to be the
most important, reasoning that the economic concerns it embodies lie at the
heart of copyright protection.8' Applications of this factor in the educa-
tional context include the analysis in Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphic
Corp.8 2 In Kinko IS, the district court held that a copy shop's reproduction
and sale of course packs to college students was not a fair use of the
copyrighted material. 3 Many of the court's arguments regarding the four
factors were later repeated in Michigan Document Services. The Kinko 's
court found that the first fair use factor, the "purpose and character of the
s See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568.
76 See id.
7 See id. Derivative works are those "based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
78 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
7' See Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 855 F.
Supp. 905, 910-11 (E.D. Mich. 1994), affd inpart, vacated inpart, 99 F.3d 1381
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
80 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566; Michigan Document Servs., 855 F.
Supp. at 910.
8, See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 ("The market for potential derivative uses
includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or
license others to develop."); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (noting the fourth
factor is concerned with "use that supplants any part of the normal market for a
copyrighted work").
82 Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). The Kinko's decision was not appealed.
83 See id. at 1526.
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use," weighed against the copy shop, because it was a commercial entity. 4
Reasoning that a commercial use and an educational use are mutually
exclusive, the court concluded that a fair use could not exist if the copy
shop stood to gain financially. 85 The court did not consider the students'
use at all.86
The court analyzed the second factor, "the nature of the copyrighted
work," in favor of Kinko's, due to the primarily factual nature of the copied
works.8 7 With regard to the third factor, "the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," the court
noted that the copying was substantial - the defendant often copied entire
chapters and duplicated critical portions of the original works. As a result,
the third factor weighed against Kinko's. 8 Finally, in looking at the fourth
factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work," the court, like the Michigan Document Services court,
focused primarily on the plaintiffs' loss of potential licensing fees. 9 The
court concluded that the fourth factor weighed against fair use simply
because the plaintiffs lost potential royalty income when the defendant
copied the material without paying them permission fees.90 The court
concluded, however, that the plaintiffs had lost the permission fees before
first determining whether they were even entitled to them. The Sixth
Circuit in Michigan Document Services used the same circular reasoning
to reach a similar conclusion against a finding of fair use.91
84 See id. at 1531-32.
85 See id.
86 See Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copy-
right Fair Use: A Principled and Predictable Body ofLaw, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
143, 150 (1993) ("[U]nder the [Kinko's] court's strained logic, a professor's use of
a not-for-profit copy shop would constitute a valid fair use - even though the
copyright holders would suffer identical injury .....
87 See Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1533.
88 See id. at 1533-34. The court concluded that "the portions copied were criti-
cal parts of the books copied, since that is the likely reason the college professors
used them in their classes." Id. at 1533. Under this reasoning, however, a
photocopy could never constitute fair use because any copy would include the
critical parts merely as a result of the choice of that part for copying. See Anderson
& Brown, supra note 86, at 152.
89 See Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1534-35.
90 See id. at 1534.
91 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Sen's., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
1387-88 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
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IV. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S FAIR USE DISCUSSION
IN MICHIGANDOCUMENT SERVICES, AND ITS FLAWS
A. Facts
Michigan Document Services ("MDS") is a copy shop that provides
general photoreproduction services to the public.92 In addition, MDS sells
"course packs," which are compilations of various copyrighted and
uncopyrighted materials, such as journal articles, sample test questions,
course notes, and book excerpts, to college students.93 Professors select the
contents of these course packs and give the material to MDS along with an
estimated number of students expected to enroll in the particular course.94
MDS requires all of the professors to sign a declaration that they would not
have requested copies of excerpts if they would otherwise have assigned
the entire work.9" MDS then produces a master copy of the materials,
creates a table of contents, identifies excerpts by title and author, numbers
the pages, and binds them together.96 The course packs are priced on a per-
page basis, regardless of content.97 The professors assign the materials
contained in the course packs to students enrolled in their courses and
inform the students they can purchase the course packs at MDS.98
Alternatively, the students may copy the excerpted materials at the library,
copy them from another student, or purchase the original works. 9 MDS
sells the course packs only to students in the particular courses and does not
sell them to the general public."° Any unsold course packs are discarded.' 0'
Following the direction of several professors who submitted materials,
MDS produced course packs containing excerpts from works in which the
plaintiff publishers own the copyrights."0 Each publisher operates a
department designed specifically to receive and process requests for
92 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp.
905, 907 (E.D. Mich. 1994), affd inpart, vacated inpart, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
' See id.
94 See id. at 907.
9' See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1388 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
96 See Michigan Document Servs., 855 F. Supp. at 907.
97 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1398 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
98 See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
99 See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
'00 See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
101 See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
102 See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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permission to use any of its copyrighted works. '3 MDS, however, did not
seek permission from the plaintiffs to copy any of the excerpts and did not
pay any permission fees for the use of the excerpts before selling the course
packs to the students."°
B. The En Banc Court's Analysis
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by recognizing the obvious: the fair
use doctrine "creates an exception to the copyright monopoly," which
allows "'courts to avoid [the] rigid application of the copyright statute"'
when such application would defeat the very purpose the law was designed
to foster. 105 Noting that fair use was originally a purely judicial creation, the
Sixth Circuit focused on the fair use doctrine codified in § 107 of the
Copyright Act.106 This section was designed to codify the existing
understanding of fair use, not to expand or dilute it in any way.107 The
majority quickly concluded that § 107 does not provide "blanket immunity
for 'multiple copies for classroom use,"' despite the plain language in the
Act's preamble.'08 They went on to apply the four statutory factors,'09 and
determined that all four factors weighed against a finding of fair use. '10 In
addition, the court found that the legislative history of § 107 weighed
against a finding of fair use."' The court thus concluded that MDS was
liable for copyright infringement." 2
103 See id. at 1398-99 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
'04 See id. at 1384.
105 Id. at 1385 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,570
(1994)).
o See id.
107 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
108 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1385 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1994)) (The statute specifically states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work..
. (including multiple copies for classroom use) ... is not an infringement of
copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107.).
'09 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
Ho See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1385-90. Judge Ryan stated in
his dissent that whether a challenged use constitutes a fair use is determined by the
four statutory factors, along with any other relevant considerations. See id. at 1399
(Ryan, J., dissenting). In contrast, Judge Merritt argued in his dissent that the plain
language of the copyright statute allows for" 'multiple copies for classroom use,"
and thus found the four statutory factors to be inapplicable in this particular case.
Id. at 1394-95, & n.1 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107).
.11 See id. at 1390-91.
112 See id. at 1390-92.
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1. "The Effect upon the Potential
Market for or Value of the Copyrighted Work"
The Sixth Circuit focused most of its attention on the fourth factor, "the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work." The majority ascribed great importance to this factor, and noted that
the United States Supreme Court had described this element as the most
important." Interestingly, even dissenting Justice Ryan felt that "the fourth
factor is the single most important element of fair use."' 4 Based on United
States Supreme Court precedent,11 the Michigan Document Services court
reasoned that the burden of proof as to market effect rests with the
copyright holder if the challenged use is noncommercial in nature. 16
However, the burden rests with the defendant if the challenged use is
commercial in nature, as the court believed it was in this case.Y7 Although
the majority felt that the use of the copyrighted materials by the purchasing
students was noncommercial, they focused on the commercial duplication
and sale of the materials by MDS." The majority found that MDS's
actions in this case were similar to those of The Nation magazine in Harper
& Row,"9 which the Supreme Court had found to constitute commercial
"' See id. at 1385 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471
U.S. 539, 566 (1985)).
"14 Id. at 1407 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
" See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 490 (1984)
(holding that manufacturers' sale of home videotape recorders to the public did not
constitute copyright infringement).
116 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1385-86. Finding the use of the
copyrighted material noncommercial in nature, both Judge Merritt and Judge Ryan
assigned the burden of proof to the plaintiffs. See id. at 1396 (Merritt, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1407 (Ryan, J., dissenting). According to the Supreme Court, fair
use is an affirmative defense. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561. Therefore, the
burden of proof for all factors should lie with the party asserting the defense,
regardless of whether the nature of the use is commercial. See William F. Patry &
Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 705 (1993).
"7 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1385-86.
"s See id. at 1386. Judge Merritt and Judge Ryan both disagreed with the
majority's focus on the use of the excerpts by the copy shop in making copies; they
asserted that the proper focus should be on the students' use of the excerpts. See id.
at 1395 (Merritt, J., dissenting); id. at 1401 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
"9 See id. (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562).
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activity. 2 ° According to the majority, the students who purchased the
course packs were similar to the purchasers of The Nation who concededly
had "not put the contents of the magazine to commercial use."'' The
majority thus classified MDS's use of the excerpts as commercial by
analogy. However, the majority went on to say that even if the challenged
use was conceptualized as noncommercial and the publishers had the
burden of proving market effect, they had effectively met that burden. 12
2
One of the major tests of market harm developed by the United States
Supreme Court'u was that the copyright owner "need only show that if the
challenged use 'should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work.""'24 The court then explained
that if copy shops across the nation followed the practices of MDS, the
revenue publishers collected from licensing fees would swiftly dry up, thus
compromising the value of the publishers' copyrights.'25 The majority
rejected MDS's argument "that it is circular to assume that a copyright
owner is entitled to permission fees and then to measure market loss by
reference to the lost fees," because the argument "proves too much.'1 26 The
court felt that it should consider licensing fees whenever the market is
"'traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed."127 The court
concluded that the potential uses of the publisher's copyrighted works
"include[d] the selling of permission to reproduce portions of the works for
inclusion in course packs.' 28 Since the publishers stood to lose these fees
ifMDS was allowed to have its way, the court found that the market factor
weighed against a finding of fair use. 29
2. "Purpose and Character of the Use"
The majority found that the first factor also weighed against a finding
of fair use. First, the court found that the challenged use was primarily
commercial in nature, and referred to the argument it made in its discussion
120 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
121 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1386.
'2 See id.
23 See id. at 1386-88.
124 Id. at 1387 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (emphasis omitted)).
'25 See id.
126 Id.
127 Id. (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913,930
(2d Cir. 1994)).
'2 Id. at 1388.
129 See id.
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of the fourth factor.3 ' MDS argued that the copying would be considered
"'nonprofit educational"' if done by the professor or students themselves,
and that making the character of the use hinge on the character of the user
was irrational and counter to the goals of copyright.' In response, the
majority emphasized that the copying "was performed on a profit-making
basis by a commercial enterprise. 132 The court next stated that "the degree
to which the challenged use has transformed the original copyrighted
works" is another element to consider under the first factor. 33 The majority
felt that there was clearly no transformative value in this case, since all that
had been done was verbatim copying. In the court's opinion, this mechani-
cal transformation had little resemblance to the creative metamorphosis
accomplished by the parodists in the Campbell case."'34
3. "The Nature of the Copyrighted Work"
The court found that the second factor was largely undisputed.'35 MDS
*conceded that "the excerpts copied for the coursepacks contained creative
material" as opposed to factual material. 136 Accordingly, these works lay
at the heart of what copyright law was intended to protect, and the second
factor thus weighed against a finding of fair use. 37
4. "Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used"
The Sixth Circuit determined that the third factor also weighed against
a finding of fair use. According to the majority, "'the larger the volume (or
the greater the importance) of what is taken, the greater the affront to the
interests of the copyright owner, and the less likely that a taking will
qualify as a fair use.""'138 The majority noted that the excerpts included in
130 See id. at 1388-89; see also supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (des-
cribing the majority's allocation of the burden of proof to Michigan Document
Services on the ground that the challenged use was commercial in nature).
13' Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1389.
132 Id. In addition, the majority indicated that it may even be doubtful whether
copying by the students or professors themselves could constitute a fair use of the
materials. See id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See id.
136 Id.
137 See id.
131 Id. (quoting Leval, supra note 40, at 122).
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the course packs easily surpassed the thousand-word safe harbor described
in the legislative history of the Copyright Act.139 The court then observed
that MDS used as much as thirty percent of one copyright work, and in no
case used less than five percent of a copyrighted work.4 ° The court
believed that these percentages were more than sufficient to qualify as
substantial.14' Finally, the court concluded that the excerpts must have been
important qualitatively to the copyrighted works in which they were
embedded. After all, the professors had deliberately picked these passages
out.
142
5. Legislative History
In addition to applying the four statutory factors, the Sixth Circuit
relied on the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act in concluding
that MDS's course pack production did not constitute a fair use'44 The
majority felt that it was necessary to refer to the legislative history because
"[tihe statutory factors are not models of clarity, and the fair use issue has
long been a particularly troublesome one."145 According to the majority,
"[t]he House and Senate conferees explicitly accepted the Classroom
Guidelines 'as part of their understanding of fair use.""' In addition, the
majority noted that the Supreme Court frequently had made use of the
"I See id. at 1389 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-71 (1976)).
140 See id.
41 See id. In contrast, Judge Merritt felt that the excerpts "were a small percen-
tage of the total work," and emphasized that the district court had observed that the
excerpts contained in the course packs "were 'truly "excerpts" and [did] not purport
to be replacements for the original works."' Id. at 1396 (Merritt, J., dissenting)
(quoting Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp.
905, 910 (E.D. Mich. 1994), affd inpart, vacated inpart, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997)). Thus, Judge Merritt
determined that the third factor weighed in favor of fair use. See id.
142 See id. Judge Ryan, on the other hand, argued that the professors' selection
and assignment of the excerpts was irrelevant in assessing the value of the material
copied in relation to the whole work. See id. at 1405 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
143 See H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-71 (1976).
' See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1390-9 1.
14. Id. at 1390.
146Id. at 1390 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, at 70 (1976)). The
"Classroom Guidelines" refer to a congressional agreement that established
guidelines for book and periodical copying by public educational institutions. See
H.R REP. No. 1476, at 68-71 (1976).
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legislative history when faced with a fair use dilemma. 4 Although the
majority stated that "the Classroom Guidelines purport to 'state the
minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use,' ,,148 it
nevertheless found that those guidelines offered"a general idea' 14 9 as to the
type of copying Congress believed would constitute a fair use. The majority
concluded that MDS's copying went "well beyond anything envisioned by
the Congress."'5 ° Even recognizing that the Classroom Guidelines "do not
have the force of law,"'5 the majority nevertheless concluded that because
MDS's copying exceeded the thousand-word safe harbor provided for in
the Classroom Guidelines, the legislative history weighed against a finding
of fair use. 52 Thus the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment
in favor of the publishers, rejecting MDS's fair use defense.'53
B. Flaws in the Sixth Circuit's Analysis
The Sixth Circuit's decision in this case is fatally flawed. In reaching
the conclusion that fair use did not apply, the court disregarded the
constitutional purpose of copyright,' misapplied the fair use factors, and
erroneously gave weight to the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright
Act. 5 These errors resulted in a nonsensical decision that unduly restricts
educational uses of copyrighted works.
47 See id. The majority observed that the copyright statute was revised in an
unusual manner in 1976. Congress and the Register of Copyrights initiated and
supervised negotiations overspecific legislative language among interested groups,
including authors, publishers, and educators. See id. The results of these negotia-
tions were included in the statute or incorporated into the committee reports. See
id.
141 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 69 (1976)).
149 Id.
150 Id.
' Id. at 1391.
' See id. The majority based its decision primarily on the "systematic and pre-
meditated character,. . . magnitude, , . .anthological content, and... commercial
motivation of the copying done by MDS" in producing the course packs. Id. at
1390.
s See id. at 1393.
See infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
s See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1391.
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1. Purpose of Copyright
The purpose of copyright is not "to reward the labor of authors,", 6 but
rather "[tio promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 57 Although
it may seem unfair that copyrighted works may be used by others without
compensation to authors, the Supreme Court has observed that this use is
not "'some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme"' but rather is
"'the essence of copyright' ,,158 and a "constitutional requirement. ' 159
Instead of focusing on the production of knowledge, the Sixth Circuit
seemed obsessed with the economic interests of the publishers. The
majority initially noted that the purpose of the copyright "monopoly" is to
"'stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.' "160 They then
proceeded to reject that rationale, focusing instead on the publisher's
economic incentives to publish academic works .16 According to the
majority, the writings of most academic authors have a very narrow appeal,
and at least some of the excerpted works were only marginally profitable
for the publishers. 62 Thus, if the publishers could not receive permission
fees, they would lack the incentive to continue publishing academic
writings, and the overall production and dissemination of knowledge would
thus suffer.16
3
This argument is superficially appealing, until one realizes that it is
simply unsupported by the record. There was no evidence in the record that
publishers need the assurance of licensing fees to publish academic
works.' 64 Judge Ryan argued in dissent that "it is far from clear that the
licensing income is significant to publishers in their decisions about
whether to publish marginally profitable books.' 65 In fact, the evidence
156 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
157 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
s Feist, 499 U.S at 349 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 US. 539, 589 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
159 Id.
'6o Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1391 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Univer-
sal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,431-32 (1984)).
161 See id.
162 See id.
'63 See id.
164 See id. at 1410 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting). Judge Ryan noted that there was no evidence in
the record indicating that the expectation of licensing fees impacts publishers'
decisions to publish in individual cases. See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
he noted that the fees the publishers have collected to date from copy shops are too
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actually presented in the case clearly indicates that the authors of academic
works do not need licensing fees as an incentive to create additional
works. 166 These authors are far more concerned with their academic
reputations than with money, and they know that the best path to a good
reputation is the production of a large body of solid research. Since the
publishers have not shown their need for licensing revenues, and since the
authors have shown they don't need licensing revenues, it seems curious
that the court placed so much emphasis on them in its analysis.
The implications of this case are potentially far-reaching. The fees
publishers will require for copying excerpts of their copyrighted works will
in turn be passed on to the students who use them. 167 Furthermore, there is
no guarantee that the publishers will grant permission to use all of their
copyrighted works. If professors decide not to produce customized reading
selections because of the added burden of seeking permission from every
publisher, it is the students who will suffer. 68 Neither the fair use doctrine
nor the constitutional grant of the copyright monopoly requires this result;
indeed, this result would seem to contravene the promotion of"Science and
useful Arts .' 69 As Chief Judge Martin warned in his dissent, "[t]he
majority's strict reading of the fair use doctrine promises to hinder
scholastic progress nationwide."'7 0
2. Application of the Statutory Factors
Because the Sixth Circuit incorrectly applied three of the four statutory
fair use factors, it erroneously concluded that these factors weighed against
a finding of fair use. The court erred in its analysis of the first factor
because it concluded that the use of the course packs was commercial in
nature. In reality, the users were the students, and the use was actually
"'nonprofit educational.' ,,17 The court misapplied the third statutory factor
because there was no evidence that the excerpts were substantial enough to
small to affect in any meaningful way the publishers' decisions to publish academic
works. See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
166 See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting). According to the declarations on record of
more than one hundred authors, "they write for professional and personal reasons"
and the "receipt of immediate monetary compensation such as a share of licensing
fees is not their primary incentive to write." Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
167 See id. at 1393-94 (Martin, C.J., dissenting).
161 See id. at 1394 (Martin, C.J., dissenting).
169 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
170 Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1393 (Martin, C.J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 1389 (quoting argument of MDS).
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supersede the original works. There also was no evidence that the excerpts
were important enough to constitute the heart of the original material. The
court further failed to subject the excerpts to a work-by-work analysis as
required by Supreme Court precedent, 72 nor did it take into account the
fact that not all of the excerpted material was original, and hence did not
qualify as protected expression. Finally, the court misapplied the fourth
factor when it assumed that the publishers were entitled to permission fees,
despite the fact that this was precisely the issue in dispute in this case.
a. "Purpose and Character of the Use"
The Sixth Circuit incorrectly concluded that the first factor weighed
against a finding of fair use. In determining that the course packs consti-
tuted a commercial use of the publishers' copyrights,m the court erred by
disregarding the use of the course packs by the professors and students.
MDS did not exploit the publisher's copyrights, but simply earned a fee for
its services. The court also erred in concluding that the course packs had
not "transformed the original copyrighted works."'74
The court found that the use of the copyrighted excerpts in the course
pack was commercial in nature,' but the student and professors' use of the
course packs was entirely a nonprofit, educational use. Indeed, Congress
specifically mentioned "teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use)" as an illustration of fair use. The course packs fall squarely within
this statutory illustration of fair use, because MDS produced them at the
professors' requests specifically for students to use in conjunction with
courses taught by those professors.'77 MDS sold the course packs only to
students enrolled in the professors' courses; no course packs were sold for
use outside the classroom. 178
Although MDS did make a profit by copying and selling the course
packs, the mere existence of this profit should not preclude a finding of fair
use. 179 The Supreme Court has recognized that if the commercial nature of
172 See id. at 1385-88.
173 See id. at 1389.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 1386.
176 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
177 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1398 (Ryan, 3., dissenting).
178 See id.
179 See Spalding, supra note 3, at 455 (recognizing profit motive of those in-
volved in the copying process does not preclude finding of fair use). Similar uses,
such as scholarship, research, and criticism, have been found to constitute fair uses
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a use carries a presumption against fair use, "the presumption would
swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph
of § 107, including... teaching,... since these activities 'are generally
conducted for profit in this country."'180 Consequently, the Supreme Court
has stated that the distinctionbetween commercial andnoncommercial uses
is not the profit motive of the user but "whether the user stands to profit
from exploitation of the copyrighted material."'' In his dissent, Judge
Ryan determined that a party profits from exploiting copyrighted material
when that party "assesses the marketable potential from copyrighted
material, selects material based on its content in order to reproduce those
portions that will attract customers, and therefore profits from the
substance of the copyrighted work."'' 8 The majority criticized this
assessment because the dictionary definition of "exploit" includes "to take
advantage of" and "to utilize."'8 3 However, the conclusion that MDS did
not "exploit" the copyright of the works excerpted is no different even
under the majority's definition. MDS was indifferent as to whether or not
the material it copied at the direction of the professors was copyrighted,
because MDS charged on a per-page basis and took no part in the selection
of excerpts to copy.8 4 The money paid by the students to MDS was for the
time, effort, materials, and expense that the students would otherwise have
had to expend to make the copies themselves; it was not money that the
students would otherwise have paid to the plaintiff publishers.'85 Indeed,
course packs like the ones MDS reproduced and sold represent a commer-
cial use only in the most mechanical sense, in that money changed hands.
As both Judge Merritt and Judge Ryan pointed out in their respective
dissents,'86 the majority erred in focusing on MDS's mechanical reproduc-
tion of the excerpts without considering the use of the excerpts by the
professors and students. Nothing in the 1976 Copyright Act 8 7 implies that
the distinction between fair and unfair use hinges on who is doing the
even though considerable profits were earned from them. See id.
180 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (quoting
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985)).
181 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
182 Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1401 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 1386 n.3 (citing WEBSTER'STHIRDNEWINTERNATIONALDICTIONARY
801 (1986) (unabridged)).
14 See id. at 1398 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
185 See id. at 1395 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
186 See id. at 1394 (Merritt, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1397 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
187 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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copying. 88 If the students or professors had made the copies themselves at
a library, they still would have had to pay money to make copies and
someone would therefore have made a profit from the copying process. 8 9
MDS earned its profit in a similar manner, by simply providing a copying
service rather than exploiting the content of the copyrighted works. 19
The majority asserted that if it considered the use of the excerpts by the
professors and students, the manufacture of pirated editions of any
academic copyrightedwork couldneverbe considered an unfair use.19' This
slippery slope argument fails when one considers that in such cases, the
people manufacturing these works are specially selecting them based on
content, and moreover are selling them for a profit. In this case, MDS had
no part in the selection of the material it copied,192 and therefore could not
have profited from the content of a copyrighted work. MDS did not care if
the work was copyrighted or not - it still got paid the same fiat per-page
fee.
193
The court further supported its conclusion that the use of the excerpts
in course packs was commercial by comparing this case with Harper &
Row.' The majority noted that the Supreme Court focused on the
"commercial" use of the copyrighted excerpts by the magazine publisher
in Harper & Row, and not on their noncommercial use by the magazine
purchasers. 19 The majority analogized the students and professors in MDS
to the magazine purchasers in Harper & Row.196 Thus, because the Harper
& Row Court found the magazine publisher's use to be commercial in
nature, the majority in Michigan Document Services found it appropriate
to characterize MDS's use of the copyrighted excerpts as a commercial
18 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1395 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
189 Some may argue that there is a distinction between students making copies
at a library as opposed to a copy shop because a library is a nonprofit organization
and a copy shop is usually a for-profit enterprise. This distinction is illusory,
however, because it imposes an essentially unattainable requirement; indeed, such
a requirement would prevent professors and students from photocopying
copyrighted material for teaching and research purposes unless no one profited
from the copying process.
190 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1393 (Martin, C.J., dissenting).
'9' See id. at 1386 n.2.
2 See id. at 1398 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
113 See id. at 1398 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
"9 Seeid. at 1386 (citing Harper& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., Inc.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
19s Id. at 1386.
196 See id.
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use. 197 However, Harper & Row is inapposite because the defendant in that
case (like the hypothetical pirate manufacturers above) both directed and
profited from the copying.98 The defendant in Harper & Row carefully
selected the excerpts based on content, and sought to profit from that
content rather than from the mechanical task of reproduction itself.'99
Conversely, MDS had no interest in the content of the material it copied
and did not stand to profit from that content.
Furthermore, the defendant in Harper & Row had engaged in highly
unethical conduct20 with "the intended purpose of supplanting the
copyright holder's commercially valuable right of first publication."20' In
contrast to the magazine in Harper & Row, the course packs reproduced
and sold by MDS did not supplant the publishers' first publication rights,
nor did they replace the publishers' works. In addition, neither MDS nor
the professors obtained the excerpted materials in an illegal and unethical
manner. This lack of bad faith renders Michigan Document Services easily
distinguishable from Harper & Row.
In addition to mischaracterizing the use of the excerpts as commercial
in nature, the court erred in its application of the first factor by summarily
concluding that the course packs did not have transformative value.202
Courts and commentators have recognized that significant independent
value can result from the conversion of original works into formats
different from their normal appearances.23 A course pack falls within this
197 See id.
198 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562-63.
199 See id. at 543. The editor of The Nation "put together what he believed was
a 'real hot news story' composed of quotes, paraphrases, and facts drawn
exclusively from the manuscript." Id. He clearly intended to benefit from the
content of the works rather than their mere mechanical reproduction. Thus, the
Court argued that The Nation was exploiting'the copyrighted material. See id. at
543, 562. In contrast, MDS was utterly indifferent to the contents of the works it
copied - it was being paid a flat fee per page. There was no attempt to manipulate
the contents of the copied materials. See Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d
1381, 1398 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
20 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562-63.
201 Id.
202 See id. at 1389.
203 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 nA0
(1984) (acknowledging possible benefits from copying that might otherwise seem
to serve no productive purpose); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60
F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing transformative value of photocopying
that converts articles into useful format); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A
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description, as it is a new product comprising selected portions of other
works perfectly customized to the professor's individualized purpose.
Professors can produce a course pack when there is no existing text that
meets their needs. In addition, professors can supplement a traditional text
with current articles and non-traditional sources. By extracting from
various works, arranging them in a particular way, and adding his or her
own commentary, a professor can produce a course pack that is a unique
product with no adequate substitute. The course pack may even be
copyrightable itself as a compilation, if original enough. A casebook, after
all, is nothing more than an extensive course pack. Thus, it is certainly
possible for a course pack to have transformative value, and the majority
erred by not considering that value.
Even if the course packs do not have transformative value, the majority
failed to recognize that they clearly fall within a specific exemption.
Congress clearly stated, in § 7 of the 1976 Copyright Act, that "multiple
copies for classroom use" is an illustration of a possible fair use.2°4 Relying
on this statutory language, the Supreme Court in Campbell stated that "the
straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribution" is an
"obvious statutory exception" to the transformative use analysis.20 1
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit should have concluded that the first factor
weighed in favor of a finding of fair use.
b. "Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used"
The court also erred in determining that the third statutory factor
weighed against a finding of fair use. Unfortunately, no bright line rules
exist for determining the amount of a copyrighted work a person may use
and still not infringe. 2 6 However, the court's evaluation failed to take into
account some important factors that should have been incorporated into the
analysis.
First, there is no indication that most of the excerpts included in the
course packs were so substantial as to supersede the original works. This
Comment on theFair UseDoctrine, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1137, 1143 & n.29 (1990)
(discussing potential value from non-transformative copying).
204 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
205 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 n.1 1 (1994).
206 See Spalding, supra note 3, at 458 ("There are no absolute rules as to how
much of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be considered a fair use.").
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test is the quantitative test.2 °7 The size of the excerpts ranged from five to
thirty percent of each work. While there admittedly is no bright line, it is
vital to examine each work separately and determine whether the excerpt
from that particular work tends to supersede its original. That examination
was not done in Michigan Document Services. In addition, the court
misapprehended the qualitative inquiry. The majority simply asserted that
the professors' assignment of the course packs as required reading was
ample" 'evidence of the qualitative value of the copied material.' 1208 There
is no evidence, however, that any of the excerpts constituted the "heart" of
the copyrighted works like the memoir excerpts published by The Nation
in the Harper & Row case.209 Moreover, as Judge Ryan observed in his
dissent, the mere fact that the professors required their students to read the
excerpts of the copyrighted material in the course packs reveals nothing
about the value of the materials copied in relation to their respective
works.2 10 The only inference that may fairly be drawn from a professor's
decision to include an excerpt in the course pack is that the excerpt is
related to the professor's course, while the remainder of the work is not.
The majority's rule, on the other hand, basically makes it impossible for
academic copying ever to be a fair use, since one could always claim that
the fact that a professor assigned the excerpt means the excerpt constitutes
the "heart" of a work.
Finally, the court absolutely failed to conduct a case-by-case analysis
to determine how much of the copied material was protectable. Originality
is a condition precedent for copyright protection. The facts themselves (as
opposed to their expression) are not protectable. In addition, protection is
of limited duration, which means that some of the material copied may
already have become part of the public domain at the time of its use.2 , By
failing to quantify how much of each excerpt was protectable, the court
effectively punished MDS for doing something completely legal- copying
unprotected material. This becomes especially important when one
considers that some excerpts were, quantitatively at least, very small -
207 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
208 Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
1389 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997).
209 SeeHarper&Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65 (finding that quotations used in 300-
word excerpt of copyrighted book constituted "the heart of the book").
210 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1405 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
2 See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 37, at 24-26 (discussing importance of
conducting work-by-work analysis and excluding unoriginal material).
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about five percent of their works.212 Consideration of the quantity of
protected material might have been dispositive in those cases. Thus, the
court erred in misconceiving both the quantitative and qualitative aspects
of this inquiry.
c. "Effect of the Use upon the
Potential Market for or Value of the Copyrighted Work
The court erroneously concluded that the fourth factor, the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,
weighed against a finding of fair use.213
The course packs sold by MDS did not harm the value of the
publishers' copyrights, because the professors would not have required
their students to purchase the entire copyrighted works if the professors had
not included the excerpts in their course packs.214 Thus, the publishers
could not claim that the market for book sales was affected by the course
packs. Instead, the publishers relied on lost permission fees as proof of
market impact. The publishers argued, and the majority agreed, that if other
copy shops stopped paying permission fees, a substantial revenue stream
for the publishers would shrivel, thereby diminishing the value of the
copyrighted works.21 The Sixth Circuit, like other courts, 16 followed the
publishers' argument and made the mistake of assuming its own conclu-
sion: copyright owners are entitled to royalty payments. 17 Both Judge
Merritt and Judge Ryan correctly recognized that this argument is
circular. 18 Before deciding whether the course packs effectively deprived
212 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1389.
213 See id. at 1386.
214 See id. at 1396 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
215 See id. at 1387.
216 See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. 60 F.3d 913,927 (2d Cir.
1994) (stating that authors commonly sell theirworks to publishers in exchange for
royalties); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1531
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (referring to a "copyright holder's commercially valuable right").
217 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1387, 1391-92.
218 See id. at 1396 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should not deter-
mine amount of economic harm to publishers by lost licensing fees because that
assumes they are entitled to those fees); id. at 1407 (Ryan, J., dissenting) ("'It is
circular to argue that a use is unfair, and a fee therefor required, on the basis that
the publisher is otherwise deprived of a fee."' (quoting Princeton Univ. Press v.
Michigan Document Servs., Inc., No. 94-1778, 1996 WL 54741, at *11 (6th Cir.
Feb. 12, 1996), vacated, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1336 (1997))).
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the publishers of their permission fees, the court should first have
determined whether or not the publishers were in fact entitled to those fees.
The fact that a market for licensing fees may exist because the publishers
have created one is not relevant in cases where the publishers are not
entitled to licensing fees in the first place. The potential market for
licensing fees cannot be relied upon as a market harm, because such
reliance presupposes that non-licensed copying is not a fair use, which is
the very question at issue. The majority claimed that no circularity problem
existed because the sale of licenses to copy excerpts constituted a potential
use of the copyrighted works,219 and asserted that "the circularity argument
proves too much.""22 The majority's approach, however, is equally
culpable, since it would seemingly always result in a conclusion of market
harm.221 To resolve this problem, the court limited its consideration of the
lost permission fees to markets that are "'traditional, reasonable, or likely
to be developed."22 The majority then asserted that "the likelihood that
publishers will actually license such reproduction is a demonstrated fact,"
because a licensing market was already in place?3
The mere existence of a licensing market, however, does nothing to
further the publishers' claim to permission fees, assuming MDS's copying
constituted fair use." Indeed, the fair use doctrine openly acknowledges
that copyright owners will lose such potential royalty payments.' The
purpose of the fair use doctrine is to determine when a partymay reproduce
copyrighted material without paying the copyright owner.226 The majority's
argument, on the other hand, eviscerates fair use, transforming it from a
219 See id. at 1387.
220 Id.
22' See id. at 1407 (Ryan, J. dissenting).
222 Id. at 1387 (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d
913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)).
223 Id. at 1388.
224 Judge Merritt argued in dissent that "[s]imply because the publishers have
managed to make licensing fees a significant source of income from copyshops and
other users of their works does not make the income from the licensing a factor"
the court should consider. Id. at 1397 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
m See Anderson & Brown, supra note 86, at 152. ("The fact that royalty pay-
ments will be lost by the copyright owner is openly acknowledged in the doctrine
of fair use.").
226 See id.
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broad multi-issue inquiry into a narrow question focused on whether or not
the plaintiff suffered economic harm.227
In asserting that the loss of licensing fees is an appropriate consider-
ation under the fourth factor, the court relied on three arguments, none of
which is compelling. First, the majority declared that "Congress has
implicitly suggested that licensing fees should be recognized in appropriate
cases as part of the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work
.... 228 One searches in vain for any support for that statement, as not even
one example is cited. It is, to be charitable, far from clear whether Congress
intended licensing fees to be considered in the analysis of the fourth factor.
Second, the court looked to American Geophysical Union v. Texaco
Inc.,2 9 where the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff publishers
"demonstrated a substantial harm to the value of their copyrights" through
lost licensing revenue." This reliance on Texaco is questionable, because
that court based its decision on the same circular reasoning that the Sixth
Circuit used in Michigan Document Services." I In addition, the two cases
are factually distinguishable.'- Finally, the majority relied upon Harper &
Row in arguing that the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case "was
obviously premised on the assumption that the copyright holder was
entitled to licensing fees for use of its copyrighted materials," since the
plaintiff in Harper & Row based its harm on the market for the licensing
of excerpts." Judge Ryan noted in his dissent, however, that there was a
key distinction between Harper & Row and the facts of Michigan
' See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1386-88.
128 Id. at 1387.
'9 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
230 Id. at 931.
"3 For an article criticizing the Texaco majority for making a circular argument
based on permission fees, see Karen L. Still, Comment, American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, Inc.: Expanding the Copyright Monopoly, 29 GA. L. REv. 1233,
1256-57 (1995); see also Texaco, 60 F.3d at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (recogniz-
ing circularity problem when only identifiable market harm is loss of potential
licensing fees).
232 The copying challenged in Texaco consisted of entire articles copied for
archival purposes. These copies then replaced the original articles. The copying in
Michigan Document Services, on the other hand, consisted of mere excerpts,
because the professors did not want their students to purchase the entire works. The
articles in Texaco were substitutes for the originals, which damaged the market
value of their copyrights. Conversely, the excerpts copied by MDS did not compete
with the originals.
" Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1388.
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Document Services: the copyright holder in Harper & Row had conceived
of a specific derivative work and taken steps to create and profit from that
work. In Michigan Document Services, by contrast, there was no evidence
that the plaintiff publishers planned to create any derivative works that the
course packs might devalue. 34 Because there was no evidence that the
publishers intended to produce any derivative works, such as their own
course packs, the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Harper & Rowto show market
harm is misplaced. Thus the court should have concluded that the fourth
factor weighed in favor of fair use, and that a finding of fair use was
warranted.
3. Legislative History
The court erroneously resorted to the legislative history of the
Copyright Act 35 in deciding that the reproduction and sale of the course
packs didnot constitute fair use." The majority asserted that it shouldtake
legislative history into account because the "statutory factors are not
models of clarity, and the fair use issue has long been a particularly
troublesome one." '237 Although courts may have difficulty applying the fair
use doctrine and its factors, any confusion concerning fair use is more
likely the result of the intense factual inquiry required in these cases than
the result of an ambiguous statute. Generally, if a statute is unambiguous,
courts should not expand or construct its meaning by looking to its
legislative history. 8 The majority failed to explain how § 107 of the Act
2" See id. at 1408 (Ryan, J. dissenting). The plaintiff in Harper & Row had
already contracted with Time magazine to give it the exclusive right to print
excerpts of President Ford's memoirs when the defendant illicitly obtained a copy
of the unpublished memoirs and produced a short article based on them. See Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985). Judge Ryan
observed that the publishers would be unable to create a market for the product
MDS produced, because the existing market is created by professors with
individual preferences. See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1408 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
23- See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-71 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N.
(90 Stat.) 5659, 5681-83.
236 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1383.
237 Id. at 1390.
238 See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991);
see also Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,253-54 (1992) (stating
that judicial inquiry into application of unambiguous statute begins and ends with
the statute); United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)
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is ambiguous at all - in fact, on its face, this section seems to clearly outline
which-factors are to be considered in determining whether or not a use is
fair.
239
Moreover, even if § 107 is ambiguous, the court was wrong to turn to
the legislative history of the Copyright Act. The majority looked princi-
pallyto the Classroom Guidelines contained inthe legislative history,24° but
as critics have noted, "reliance [on the Guidelines] for guidance about fair
use is questionable at best." '24 Judge Ryan, for instance, argued in dissent
that "it is entirely inappropriate to rely on the Copyright Act's legislative
history at all." '242 The Classroom Guidelines are presented in a committee
report, which itself is "unreliable... as a genuine indicator of congressio-
nal intent."243 Indeed, Congress actually considered the language of the
Classroom Guidelines and rejected it; thus, reliance on the Guidelines is
even more dubious.24
Finally, the Classroom Guidelines themselves explicitly state that they
cannot be cited as evidence of copyright infringement, declaring that they
are "the minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair
use."245 The Classroom Guidelines merely provide a safe harbor where
copyright infringement will not be found - some copying may not fall
within the safe harbor and yet still be considered a fair use.24' Thus, while
the length of copyrighted excerpts reproduced in the course packs exceeded
the safe harbor amount, a finding of fair use could nevertheless absolve
(explaining that the "plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in
the 'rare cases [where] the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."' Id. (quoting Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
239 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
240 SeeH.R. REP.NO. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(90 Stat) 5659, 5681-83.
241 Anderson & Brown, supra note 86, at 156. The Classroom Guidelines set
forth "bright line rules that indicate when teachers are within a safe harbor." Id.
Even as a safe harbor, however, the Guidelines do not "provide meaningful
standards for determining when classroom uses infringe" on copyrights. Id.
242 Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1411 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
243 Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (Scalia, J., con-
curring).
244 See Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d at 1412 (Ryan, 3., dissenting).
245 H.R REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90
Stat.) 5659, 5681.
246 See id.
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MDS of any copyright infringement irrespective of the Classroom
Guidelines.
V. THE IMPACT OF MICHIGANDOCUMENT SERVICES
The effect of the court's decision in Michigan Document Services is to
transform the Copyright Act into a licensing act for publishers.247 The
court's emphasis on market effect makes it virtually impossible to imagine
a case where academic copying could be considered a fair use. Under the
majority's rationale, even a student copying works on his own is an
infringer - every copy made by this student takes money away from
licensed copies. This broad interpretation is obviously to the publishers'
economic benefit. In order to solidify their claims to a licensing market, the
publishers have created the Copyright Clearance Center.248 This was done
for two reasons. First, the publishers needed to establish a mechanism to
license before they could claim licensing fees.249 Second, this licensing
system would create a new market, making it easier for publishers to claim
economic harm under the fourth factor.250 The problem with this in the
educational context is that it undercuts the guiding purpose of copyright -
to promote the advancement and dissemination of knowledge. By
interfering with professorial freedom to choose the manner in which their
classes are taught, the Copyright Clearance Center strikes at the heart of
America's universities in order to satisfy the greed of a very small portion
of the populace.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit incorrectly concluded in Michigan Document
Services that the reproduction and sale of course packs solely for educa-
tional use is not a fair use of copyrighted materials. The court's fair use
inquiry was flawed in several respects. The majority misapplied the
statutory fair use factors, incorrectly relied on the legislative history of §
107 of the Copyright Act, and disregarded the constitutional purposes of
copyright law.
247 See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 37, at 38.
248 See id. at 39-41. The Copyright Clearance Center is "an organization of
publishers that collects and distributes licensing fees for photocopying materials
registered with it." Id. at 21 n.17.
249 See id. at 39.
250 See id.
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In response to Michigan Document Services, publishers have moved
swiftly to consolidate their gains. Their attempts to achieve hegemony over
educational uses of their copyrights must be halted. Thankfully, no
amendment to the Copyright Act is necessary; all that is required is that
courts correctly apply the current fair use factors.

